Advancement of Legal Fees May Be More Than Corporations Bargained For: Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio 2012) by Graham, Caitlin
University of Cincinnati Law Review 
Volume 82 Issue 1 Article 8 
September 2014 
Advancement of Legal Fees May Be More Than Corporations 
Bargained For: Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio 2012) 
Caitlin Graham 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr 
Recommended Citation 
Caitlin Graham, Advancement of Legal Fees May Be More Than Corporations Bargained For: Miller v. 
Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio 2012), 82 U. Cin. L. Rev. (2014) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/8 
This Student Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of 
Law Scholarship and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, 
please contact ronald.jones@uc.edu. 
307 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEGAL FEES MAY BE MORE THAN 
CORPORATIONS BARGAINED FOR:  
MILLER V. MILLER, 973 N.E.2D 228 (OHIO 2012) 
Caitlin Graham 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Smart, driven, and financially savvy directors are the touchstones of 
well-run corporations.  Therefore, it is no surprise that seeking and 
attracting qualified individuals to serve in those roles is a priority for 
corporations.  However, serving as a director comes with many 
responsibilities and risks.  An environment that makes it safe for 
directors to take risks encourages risk taking.  A business environment 
that encourages risk taking—prudent risk taking but still risk taking—is 
an environment that is good for business.  The “business judgment rule” 
protects officers and directors, acting in their official capacity, from 
liability for exercising the judgment demanded by their roles.1  The 
expansion of the business judgment rule and the statutory protections 
limiting directors’ personal liability for actions taken as director have 
created a framework that encourages qualified candidates to seek these 
positions, giving corporations the best opportunity to be competitive.  
To promote that capitalistic culture, a key consideration for any 
potential director is the right to advancement. 
Advancement prevents directors from having to pay out of pocket for 
legal fees incurred defending actions related to their position as 
director.2  The right of advancement creates an obligation for the 
corporation to pay the legal fees of directors as they are incurred.  
Advancement is triggered when a claim related to the conduct of a 
director in carrying out his duties as director is filed.3  Therefore, it 
allows for front-end payment.  A closely related right, but distinct from 
advancement, is indemnification, which occurs at the close of litigation 
and refers to the right of the director to be reimbursed for legal fees.4  If 
 
 1. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 770-771 (10th ed. 2011) (“[The business judgment rule] ‘is a presumption that in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and 
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.’ Nevertheless, a 
showing that the board breached either its fiduciary duty of care of its fiduciary duty of loyalty in 
connection with a challenged transaction may rebut this presumption.”) (footnote omitted) (citing 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
 2. Richard A. Rossman, et al., Symposium, Primer on Advancement of Defense Costs: The 
Rights and Duties of Officers and Corporations, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 29, 31 (2007). 
 3. Id. This was an issue raised by the plaintiff in Miller and the Court failed to adequately 
address whether or not advancement applies only in these situations. 
 4. Id.  
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the director succeeds in his defense, the corporation will reimburse the 
fees.  Otherwise, the director is responsible for the fees.5  
In 1986, the Ohio General Assembly amended its corporate statutes, 
marking a change in many corporate laws, including the addition of 
default advancement for directors.  The Ohio Supreme Court recently 
examined the advancement statute for the first time in Miller v. Miller.6  
This Article analyzes the business climate when the amendments were 
adopted, the court’s decision in Miller, and the potential issues this 
statute creates going forward, especially for close corporations.  Part II 
takes a retrospective look at the climate of corporate litigation when the 
1986 amendments were enacted, the provisions of the advancement 
amendments in Ohio and Delaware, and the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
decision in Miller.  Part III examines Ohio’s adoption of opt-out 
advancement, the Miller decision, and the effects of both on the future of 
advancement rights in Ohio.  Part IV concludes that Miller, rather than 
clarifying the issue of advancement, only succeeded in creating more 
questions for Ohio companies and the attorneys advising them.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. 1980s: A Growing Concern Regarding Personal Liability of 
Corporate Officers and Directors. 
When Ohio amended its corporate statutes in 1986, immense 
uncertainty and anxiety existed in the corporate world.  Recent court 
decisions and increasing directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance 
premiums created an environment that caused legislatures to prepare for 
the worst.7 
In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held that 
directors were not protected by the business judgment rule in situations 
in which they failed to “inform themselves of all information reasonably 
available to them and relevant to their decision” and failed to “disclose 
all material information” to shareholders.8  The transaction in Van 
Gorkom was a merger in which the CEO and the board of directors 
acted quickly to sell the company at a share price that was above market 
value but had not been independently confirmed as the intrinsic value of 
the stock.9  Rather than review any reports, the board relied on the oral 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 233 (Ohio 2012). 
 7. See Deborah Cahalane, 1986 Ohio Corporation Amendments: Expanding the Scope of 
Director Immunity, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 664 (1987). 
 8. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985). 
 9. Id. at 865–67. 
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presentations of the CEO and the company’s attorney.10  Although the 
board voted for a bid period to test the value of the stock, it did not 
review the merger contract before approving it.11  The court held that the 
board of directors acted with gross negligence for conduct that seemed 
to be mere negligence,12 thus limiting the believed broad protection of 
the business judgment rule. 
One year earlier, in Jones v. VIP Development Co., the Ohio Supreme 
Court had lowered the threshold for traditional negligence.13  Van 
Gorkom and Jones demonstrated the courts’ widespread willingness to 
hold negligent parties to a higher standard of care and resulted in great 
uncertainty for corporate directors.  
To make matters worse, at that time claims against corporate directors 
and officers had almost tripled nationally.14  In 1985, one in five 
directors was involved in litigation.15  Due to the growing number of 
claims and uncertainty about the protection of the business judgment 
rule, D&O premiums skyrocketed, increasing tenfold between 1984 and 
1986.16  At the same time, insurers refused to underwrite claims in 
excess of $10 million, despite a median policy limit of $25 million.17  
Corporations’ inability to insure directors and the expanded potential 
liability for directors resulted in an exodus of independent directors from 
corporations and a shrinking field of directors willing to undertake the 
risks associated with the position. 
For good reason, corporations were nervous.  Indiana’s legislature 
was the first to react, followed by Delaware, and then forty other 
states.18  The new amendments were designed to reduce the risk of 
directors’ personal liability for money damages in hopes of attracting 
qualified individuals to the position.19  Several states expanded 
nonexclusivity provisions, allowing for more than just 
indemnification.20  Many of these expansions seemed to allow for 
 
 10. Id. at 869. 
 11. Id. at 869. 
 12. Cahalane, supra note 7, at 669–70. 
 13. Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1059 (Ohio 1984). 
 14. Cahalane, supra note 7, at 670–71. 
 15. Id. at 671 n.44. 
 16. Id. at 671. 
 17. Id. at 671 n.46. 
 18. James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent Changes in State Legislation on Director and Officer 
Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1209 (1988). 
 19. Id. at 1209. 
 20. Id. at 1226–27 (“Nonexclusivity provisions offer an important opportunity for corporate 
counsel to craft broad protection for directors and officers. . . .  These contracts should be drafted as 
‘freestanding’ obligations containing all of the substantive rights (including advancement of expenses) 
and necessary procedures to furnish the desired protection without relying upon changeable statutes or 
charter or by-law provisions.”). 
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advancement in cases of willful misconduct or even recklessness, 
neither of which had been allowed previously.21 
B. Ohio’s Response  
In 1986, Ohio joined the movement to quell the worry and uncertainty 
and amended its corporate statutes.22  Ohio broadened its already-
codified business judgment rule and expanded the instances in which a 
director could be indemnified for legal fees.23  But most notably, Ohio 
added the right to advancement for corporate directors.24  Combined, 
these expansions greatly decreased the circumstances in which a director 
would be personally responsible for the costs of litigation.25 
The Ohio State Bar Association (OSBA) was a key player in the 
quick adoption of the 1986 amendments.26  According to the OSBA, the 
amendment was necessary because corporations were leaving Ohio, 
citing more favorable statutes in other states as the reason.27  The 
General Assembly, in an “emergency,” adopted the expansion of 
director rights.28 
Currently, the advancement of legal fees to directors is the default 
rule for Ohio corporations; the corporation must specifically opt out in 
its articles of incorporations or bylaws by citing the statute.29  The 
advancement statute provides that the duty to advance fees in a specific 
case arises when the director agrees to repay the fees if the director 
 
 21. Id. at 1226. 
 22. Cahalane, supra note 7, at 672. 
 23. Id. at 665; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(a) (West 2012). 
 24. Cahalane, supra note 7, at 672. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Merit Brief of Amicus Curiae the Ohio State Bar Association in Support of Appellant Sam 
M. Miller at 1, Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio 2012) (No. 2011-0024) [hereinafter OSBA Brief]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (West 2012). 
Unless at the time of a director’s act or omission that is the subject of an action, suit, or 
proceeding referred to in division (E)(1) or (2) of this section, the articles or the regulations of a 
corporation state, by specific reference to this division, that the provisions of this division do not 
apply to the corporation and unless the only liability asserted against a director in an action, suit, 
or proceeding referred to in division (E)(1) or (2) of this section is pursuant to section 1701.95 of 
the Revised Code, expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by a director in defending the 
action, suit, or proceeding shall be paid by the corporation as they are incurred, in advance of the 
final disposition of the action, suit, or proceeding, upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf 
of the director in which the director agrees to do both of the following:  
(i)  Repay that amount if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence in a court of 
competent jurisdiction that the director’s action or failure to act involved an act or 
omission undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or 
undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation; 
(ii)  Reasonably cooperate with the corporation concerning the action, suit, or proceeding.  
4
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loses, and the director agrees to reasonably cooperate with the 
corporation in the pending suit.30  
Unlike Ohio, the majority of states and the Model Business 
Corporation Act (The Model Act) have a permissive advancement 
statute that allows corporations to grant advancement but does not 
automatically create an obligation to advance fees.31  In permissive 
jurisdictions, a corporation will typically adopt language similar to the 
statute in its articles of incorporation or bylaws granting the right to and 
scope of advancement.32  In all jurisdictions, including Ohio, precision 
and specificity in drafting corporate governing documents is dispositive 
of the rights and obligations of directors.33 
C. Delaware Advancement  
Delaware, like Ohio, reacted to the panic by enacting statutes that 
provide expanded protection of directors under the business judgment 
rule and limit the instances in which directors are personally responsible 
for legal fees.  However, the Delaware advancement law is permissive, 
whereas the Ohio law is the default.  A Delaware corporation may 
include advancement in its articles of incorporation or its bylaws, but in 
the absence of an advancement clause, a director cannot force the 
corporation to advance legal fees.34 
The Delaware Supreme Court has addressed the issue of advancement 
several times, mostly notably in Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen.35  Homestore 
had adopted advancement rights for its officers but then refused to pay 
fees for civil and criminal proceedings for its director, Tafeen.36  The 
court held that when a company has adopted mandatory advancement, 
the company cannot avoid advancement, even under the most egregious 
circumstances.37   
Once a Delaware corporation adopts the right to advancement, the 
court will enforce the director’s rights.38  Although challenges to 
advancement are allowed in summary proceedings, the advancement 
right granted in a corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws is 
 
 30. Id.  
 31. Rossman, et al., supra note 2, at 34. 
 32. Id. at 34. 
 33. Id. at 36. 
 34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (West 2011). 
 35. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 886 A.2d 502 (Del. 2005). 
 36. Id. at 503. 
 37. Id. at 505. 
 38. Stephen A. Radin, “Sinners Who Find Religion”: Advancement of Litigation Expenses to 
Corporate Officials Accused of Wrongdoing, 25 REV. LITIG. 251, 256–57 (2006). 
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treated as a contractual provision.39  The purpose of advancement, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has stated, is to “promote the desirable end 
that corporate officials will resist what they consider unjustified suits 
and claims, secure in the knowledge that their reasonable expenses will 
be borne by the corporation they have served if they are vindicated.”40  
That purpose prevails across the country and summarizes why the right 
to advancement is important to a corporation’s ability to recruit quality 
directors. 
D. Miller v. Miller 
The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the 1986 advancement statute for 
the first time in Miller v. Miller.41  Relying on Delaware law, the Court 
held that the defendant, Sam M. Miller (Director Miller), was entitled to 
advancement of legal fees for his defense in a derivative suit brought by 
shareholders of Trumbell Industries (Shareholders-Miller), a close 
corporation.42  Trumbell Industries (Trumbell), an Ohio close 
corporation that sold plumbing supplies, was owned by four cousins, 
each of whom also served as a director of Trumbell.43 
1. The Parties: A Civil War 
The plaintiffs were one set of Miller cousins (Shareholders-Miller) 
who together owned 50% of Trumbell stock and made up two of the 
four members of the Board of Directors.44  A majority of the Board did 
not approve the suit because the four family members had been divided, 
two to two, for years.45  Trumbell was later added as a plaintiff without 
the Board’s approval.46 
The defendant, Director Miller, was another cousin who owned 25% 
of Trumbell.47  His brother was the final 25% owner.  Director Miller 
and his brother were the other two members of the Board of Directors.48  
Shareholders-Millers brought a derivative action against the 
 
 39. Id. at 256–57. 
 40. Homestore, 886 A.2d at 505. 
 41. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio 2012). 
 42. Id. at 230. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Merit Brief of Appellees at 3, Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio 2012) (No. 2011-0024) 
[hereinafter Shareholders Brief]. 
 45. Merit Brief of Appellant Sam M. Miller at *26–27, Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio 
2012) (No. 11-0024), 2011 WL 2249529 [hereinafter Miller Brief]. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Shareholders Brief, supra note 44, at 4. 
 48. Id.  
6
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defendant alleging Director Miller’s involvement with a third-party 
company that also sold plumbing supplies was a violation of his 
fiduciary duty.49  In addition to being a shareholder, Director Miller was 
Vice President of Sales and Marketing, Plumbing-Products Manager, 
and a member of the Trumbell Board of Directors.50  
2. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals Ruling: A Valiant Effort 
The claim alleged that Director Miller entered into an agreement with 
another company in violation of his fiduciary duties to Trumbell.51  
After the suit commenced, Director Miller reimbursed himself for his 
current legal fees and submitted an “undertaking” to Trumbell, calling 
on his right to advancement pursuant to ORC 1701.13(E)(5).52  
Following the provision’s requirements, Director Miller’s undertaking 
stated that he agreed to repay the fees should he not be successful in his 
defense and to reasonably cooperate with the corporation during the 
suit.53  Both sides moved for declaratory judgment on the issue of 
advancement.54  The trial court ordered Trumbell to advance the legal 
fees to Director Miller because, according to the undertaking, he had 
complied with the requirements in the Ohio statute.55  
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
Director Miller was not entitled to advancement because the relevant 
provisions of the code are limited to a lawsuit where the director is 
seeking to secure a benefit for the corporation.56  The Eleventh District 
focused on two aspects of the statute: (1) “an act or omission” and (2) 
“an action, suit, or proceeding referred to in division (E)(1) or (E)(2).”57  
The court found that this case did not meet either requirement.  First, the 
allegations centered on Director Miller’s involvement with an outside 
company, which meant that Director Miller was not acting within the 
scope of his directorial duties, and therefore, the claim did not concern 
an act or omission on behalf of the corporation.58  Second, the court 
found that the case fell within the exclusionary language contained in 
the statute because (E)(1) and (E)(2) are only applicable if the director 
 
 49. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Ohio 2012). 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Ohio law requires directors submit an undertaking, which is a written statement in which the 
director agrees to abide by O.R.C. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a). 
 53. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 230. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Miller v. Miller, 942 N.E.2d. 438, 445 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist. 2010). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
7
Graham: Advancement of Legal Fees May Be More Than Corporations Bargained
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
314 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
“acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or 
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation.”59  According to the 
court, Director Miller was not acting in the best interest of the 
corporation when he entered into the agreement with the other company.  
Section (E)(2) further excluded this action because that section relates to 
a director seeking to procure a judgment in favor of the corporation.60  
The court also explained that division (E)(1) only applies to cases “other 
than an action by or in the right of the corporation.”61  The court held 
that “any other interpretation has the potential to result in significant 
injustice to the corporation and any of the remaining shareholders.”62 
In a concurrence, Judge Grendall emphasized the finding that section 
1701.13(E)(5)(a) only allows for advancement in actions where the 
director acted in good faith and not in opposition to the best interests of 
the corporation.63  Furthermore, Judge Grendall stated that the defendant 
could not meet the requirement of reasonable cooperation because the 
defendant’s interests were opposed to the corporation’s.64  Director 
Miller appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.65  
3. The Ohio Supreme Court: A Simplified Version of the Case 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision first distinguished between the 
right to advancement and the right to indemnification.66  It found that 
advancement is a separate and distinct right while the underlying action 
is pending and is essential to the defendant’s ability to mount a 
defense.67  Therefore, advancement is not dependent on 
indemnification.68  Nor is advancement limited when the corporation 
alleges conduct that, if proven, would bar indemnification.69  The court 
found that allowing a corporation to avoid advancement by alleging 
misconduct would render the advancement law moot.70  In this way, 
Shareholders-Miller’s allegation that Director Miller violated his 
fiduciary duty did not absolve Trumbell from the obligation to advance 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 446 (Grendall, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. at 447. 
 65. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 233 (Ohio 2012). 
 66. Id. at 234. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 237. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 238. 
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Director Miller’s legal fees.71  
The corporation argued that advancement is only available in an 
“action, suit, or proceeding” referred to in (E)(1) or (2), namely where 
“the person acted in good faith, and in a manner the person reasonably 
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the 
corporation.”72  The majority dismissed this argument because, as stated 
above, advancement is not dependent on whether the director would be 
entitled to indemnification.73  The court relied heavily on United States 
v. Stein,74 a Southern District of New York case applying Delaware law, 
despite the fact that the Ohio and Delaware statutes are fundamentally 
different.75  In Stein, the main issues were whether the court had 
jurisdiction over the advancement claim and what law applied.76  The 
decision, although it contained a short discussion of the advancement 
rights in Delaware,77 provided a civil procedure analysis of 
advancement, rather than a substantive one.78  Furthermore, the case 
involved several contractual obligations regarding advancement between 
the corporation and the defendants, which were absent in Miller.79  
Although the court of appeals found the plaintiff’s argument 
persuasive, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the court of appeals 
wrongly decided the issue of advancement because it focused on 
indemnification, but the Ohio Supreme Court did not address the 
significance or role of the language in section 1701.13(E)(5) referring to 
(E)(1) and (2) that the court of appeals had found so interesting. 
The court then addressed circumstances when a corporation does not 
have a duty to advance fees.  According to ORC 1701.13(E)(5)(a), a 
company opting out of advancement must specifically state that the law 
regarding advancement does not apply to it.80  Under the statute, the 
court held that advancement is mandatory unless the company 
specifically opts out.81  The Court found that Trumbell did not 
specifically opt out of the provision.82  Trumbell’s articles of 
incorporation did allow for indemnification but made no reference to 
 
 71. Id. at 238–39. 
 72. Id. at 237. 
 73. Id. 
 74. United States v. Stein, 452 F.Supp.2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated sub nom. Stein v. 
KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 75. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 237 (Ohio 2012). 
 76. Stein, 452 F.Supp.2d at 269–71. 
 77. Id. at 271–72.  
 78. Id. at 273 (conducting an Erie Doctrine analysis of advancement law). 
 79. Id. at 239. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 240. 
 82. Id. at 239. 
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advancement.83  Because advancement is the default in Ohio, Trumbell 
had to affirmatively opt out in order to avoid it.84 
However, the court also found that, under the statute, advancement, 
although mandatory, is not automatic.85  A defendant seeking 
advancement must execute an undertaking, agreeing to repay the fees if 
his defense is unsuccessful and reasonably cooperate with the 
corporation concerning the action, suit, or proceeding.86  The court 
found that Director Miller fulfilled the requirements that triggered the 
advancement.87  Once Trumbell received Director Miller’s undertaking, 
its duty to advance legal fees became mandatory.88  
The court dismissed Shareholders-Miller’s argument that Director 
Miller was acting as an officer in his capacity as Vice President and 
therefore, was not entitled to advancement.89  The court stated that 
because the plaintiff had not raised the issue in the lower court, it could 
not do so now.90 
The majority also dismissed Shareholders-Miller’s argument that 
Director Miller did not reasonably cooperate and found that 
Shareholders-Miller’s evidence purporting to show Director Miller’s 
lack of cooperation was inadequate.91  Shareholders-Miller’s evidence 
included the trial court’s finding that Director Miller had wrongfully 
withheld documents and had been ordered to reimburse the plaintiff’s 
legal fees for expenses incurred as a result of his delay.92  Director 
Miller produced the documents, including a letter that became the crux 
of the plaintiff’s case, only after the corporation filed a request for 
sanctions.93  Shareholders-Miller also presented deposition testimony in 
which, in response to a question regarding Director Miller’s cooperation 
with the plaintiffs, Director Miller stated he would only respond to 
requests from a majority of the Board.94  Because the Trumbell Board 
had been deadlocked in a family feud for over a decade and split the 
parties in the suit, getting a majority of the Board to agree on anything 
was an impossible task.95  The court found that Shareholders-Miller did 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 240. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 240–41. 
 88. Id. at 241. 
 89. Id. at 238. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Shareholder’s Brief, supra note 44, at 15. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 18; see also Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 240 (Ohio 2012). 
 95. A majority decision was impossible because the Board was divided in the suit.  Shareholders 
10
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not point to anything specific showing Director Miller actually failed to 
cooperate, and furthermore, the court found that the duty to reasonably 
cooperate should not require the director to surrender his right to defend 
himself.96  The court again cited Stein in support of its argument that 
companies still have a duty to advance legal fees when they sue 
directors for wrongdoing.97  In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the 
court stated the evidence was inadequate to show the defendant was 
uncooperative, suggesting that evidence of an uncooperative director 
may be the way out of advancement.98  
The court held that Director Miller was entitled to advancement of his 
legal fees, despite being sued by directors/shareholders of the close 
corporation for breach of his fiduciary duties.99 
4. The Dissent: A Plea to the General Assembly 
Justice O’Donnell, in a short dissent, found that mandatory 
advancement does not apply to companies suing their own directors for 
breach of directors’ duties because such a director would have acted in 
his individual capacity and could not reasonably cooperate with the 
company.100  Therefore, the requirements for advancement cannot be 
met in those situations.101  
Advancement is only required, Justice O’Donnell argued, in claims 
arising out of service as a director.102  Therefore, Trumbell had no 
statutory duty to advance expenses if the director acted in an individual 
capacity, as he found Director Miller did.103  
The dissent argued that it was not the General Assembly’s intent to 
force a company to advance legal fees for a defense against itself.104  
This argument was evident by the wording of the statute requiring the 
director to “reasonably cooperate” with the corporation.105  As Justice 
O’Donnell explained, “when the director and the corporation are adverse 
parties in litigation, the director simply cannot reasonably cooperate in 
 
Brief, supra note 44, at 18. 
 96. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 240–41. 
 97. Id. at 241 (“[T]he duty to advance expenses often requires companies to advance the cost of 
defending claims that allege wrongs to the companies, even lawsuits brought by companies themselves 
against former officers and directors.”) (quoting United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230, 272 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 98. Id. at 240–41. 
 99. Id. at 241. 
 100. Id. at 241–42 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. at 242. 
 102. Id. at 241. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 242. 
 105. Id. 
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the manner required by the statute, and the circumstances of this case 
demonstrate the futility of expecting a director to fully and honestly 
assist the corporation’s suit against him.”106  The dissent pointed out that 
the majority failed to recognize the director’s duty to reasonably 
cooperate with the corporation.107  In this case, because Director Miller 
was being sued by the corporation, Director Miller could not reasonably 
cooperate and should not be expected to, even if he says he will.108  The 
dissent went on to say that the company should not have to wait until 
final adjudication of the underlying action before receiving a judgment 
on advancement.109  Here, the allegations had enough substance to 
suggest that Director Miller was acting ultra vires, and therefore, would 
not be entitled to indemnification protection after the case and therefore 
not entitled to advancement during the case.110  
Justice O’Donnell ended his dissent by encouraging the General 
Assembly to clarify the law in this area to exclude advancement when a 
corporation sues its own directors.111  
III. ANALYSIS 
The Miller case presented a complex situation in which to apply the 
advancement statute.  The complexity of the issues and the uniqueness 
of the parties made it a challenging case to create a valuable 
interpretation of the law for the future.  Consequently, Miller created an 
inappropriately simplistic precedent that created more uncertainty than 
existed before the case was decided.  That inappropriate simplicity is 
most poignant in the application of the statute to a closely held, family 
company. 
A. Unique Circumstances Lead to Unintended Consequences 
The 1986 Comment to the corporate amendments stated that a 
corporation, unless its articles of incorporation specifically state that 
section 1701.13(E)(5)(a) does not apply to it, is required to advance 
legal fees to a director when it receives an undertaking by the director 
(1) to repay the fees if his conduct is deemed to have been recoverable 
under section 1701.59, and (2) to cooperate with the corporation.112  The 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 243. 
 108. Id. at 242–43. 
 109. Id. at 243. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13 (West 2012). 
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1986 amendment greatly increased the allowable scope of directors’ 
actions and greatly decreased the financial risk for directors.113 
The Ohio General Assembly has a history of adopting default, rather 
than permissive, corporate laws.114  Such laws are contrary to the Model 
Act and many Delaware statutes.  One may argue that the laws make 
Ohio more “business friendly,” which is precisely what the OSBA 
argued when its Corporation Law Committee proposed the emergency 
adoption of default advancement.115  As stated above, Ohio wanted to 
stop directors and corporations from fleeing the state.116  In its amicus 
brief, the OSBA stated that the amendment was quickly adopted with 
overwhelming support.117  That many politicians are not familiar with 
the complexities of corporate law or that the OSBA had an interest 
(certainly a justified one though) in paid attorney’s fees are undisputed.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that an emergency adoption of the default 
1986 amendment has had unintended consequences.  The fact that the 
OSBA was the main contributor and that the amendment was passed in a 
frantic attempt to prevent a migration of corporations away from the 
state, begs the question whether the language adopted really does further 
the best interest of corporations, specifically close corporations like 
Trumbell.118   
The problem in 1986 was the inability of corporations to attract 
quality directors because of the threat of liability.119  As previously 
stated, good directors are often behind good corporations.  In the interest 
of promoting corporate welfare in this manner, Ohio created a default 
advancement regime.120  The concern at the time was attracting 
directors, not the actual effect of paying directors’ legal fees.121  
The consequence is the court’s ruling that advancement is mandatory 
unless a corporation opts out.  The implications of the default rule are 
apparent in Miller, which illustrates how a blanket default advancement 
rule causes problems for close corporations.122  Without proper limits, 
forcing this type of advancement regime on all corporations is contrary 
 
 113. Cahalane, supra note 7, at 672. 
 114. Examples of default provisions include the quorum default, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.51(A), the cumulative-voting default, § 1701.55, the length-of-term default, § 1701.57, and the 
liability-shield default, § 1701.59(D). 
 115. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 2. 
 116. Id. at 1. 
 117. Id.  
 118. “Close corporations have only a small number of shareholders, and are typically 
characterized by owner-management. . . .  [M]odern courts have come to understand that close 
corporations often need special treatment.”  EISENBERG & COX, supra note 1, at 452. 
 119. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 26. 
 120. Id. at 2. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Shareholders Brief, supra note 44, at 3.  
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to the purpose of the 1986 amendments.  
B. The Need for Legislative Clarification 
The Ohio Supreme Court correctly construed ORC 1701.13(E)(5)(a) 
but incorrectly distilled the case down to a corporation suing its director 
for violation of a fiduciary duty.123  This distillation oversimplified the 
facts of the claim and therefore, prevented the court from thoroughly 
analyzing the statute. 
 According to the statute, advancement is a guaranteed right for 
directors in all but two circumstances: when the corporation disclaims 
its applicability in its articles of incorporation or bylaws or when the 
director fails to meet the requirements of the statute.124  The Ohio 
Supreme Court’s holding was warranted in three ways.  Fundamentally, 
indemnification and advancement are two distinct rights, not dependent 
on each other, and advancement was the only issue in the case.125  
Statutorily, Ohio law makes advancement the default rule, and therefore, 
the corporation is responsible for understanding its advancement 
duties.126  Specifically, because the Supreme Court found Director 
Miller met the requirements of the statute, it had to find in his favor.127  
First, the Court rejected any argument that advancement is dependent 
on indemnification because under longstanding corporate law, the two 
rights are distinct, and under Ohio law, the legislature treated them 
separately.128  The Ohio Revised Code (ORC) provides that 
indemnification “may” be allowed, but the ORC provides that 
advancement “shall” be awarded as long as the statutory requirements 
are met.129  The court was correct in holding that fundamentally the two 
rights are distinct and advancement is not dependent on the ultimate 
ability to be indemnified.130 
The court was also correct in pointing out that regardless of the 
indemnification rights provided in the articles of incorporation, 
Trumbell failed to disclaim its duty to advance fees in the same articles 
or regulations.131  The Ohio statute shifts the burden to the corporation 
 
 123. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Ohio 2012). 
 124. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (West 2012). 
 125. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 429–30. 
 126. Id. at 240.  
 127. Id. at 241.  
 128. Id. at 233–34. 
 129. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(1) (“A corporation may indemnify . . . .”) (emphasis 
added); § 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (“[E]xpenses . . . shall be paid by the corporation as they are incurred . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 130. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 234. 
 131. Id. at 240. 
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to understand what duties it undertakes when it incorporates in Ohio.  
The law specifically allows a corporation to opt out completely from the 
requirement.132  Advancement, by its definition, implies an unsavory 
position in which the director of a company is being sued for her actions 
or omissions as a director.  That is precisely why the advancement right 
is important to attract directors.  The court’s holding shows that a 
corporation cannot use a statutory provision to attract a director, then 
turn around and disclaim that duty in order to avoid paying for that same 
director’s fees if and when the case arises.  If Trumbell had wanted to 
avoid advancement, it could have done so at any time by amending the 
articles or bylaws.133  Trumbell did not, and therefore, it cannot try to 
avoid its statutory obligations when an unpleasant case emerges.134 
Finally, because the court found that Director Miller met the statutory 
requirements, it correctly held his legal fees had to be advanced.  The 
court, after analyzing the “reasonable cooperation” requirement, found 
that Director Miller did comply.  Therefore, the moment Trumbell 
received the undertaking its duty was triggered.135 
On its face, the opinion applied a straightforward and correct statutory 
interpretation based on the plain language of the rule.  However, the 
case presented more complex issues that remain unsettled by the 
opinion.  
1. Are There Any Limits in Section 1701.13(E)(5)? 
The court failed to address whether advancement applies to a 
company’s suit against its own director in two regards: first, by omitting 
the provision of the statute that referred to ORC 1701.13(E)(1) or (2); 
and second, by not adequately vetting the circumstances under which 
Director Miller was sued. 
First, the court rendered the (E)(1) and (E)(2) language in section 
1701.13 superfluous and wrongly relied on a Delaware decision in 
making this determination.  ORC 1701.13 provides:  
(5)(a) Unless at the time of a director’s act or omission that is the subject 
of an action, suit, or proceeding referred to in division (E)(1) or (2) of 
this section, the articles . . . state, . . . that the provisions of this division 
do not apply to the corporation and unless the only liability asserted 
against a director in an action, suit, or proceeding referred to in division 
(E)(1) or (2) of this section is pursuant to section 1701.95 of the Revised 
Code, expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by a director in 
 
 132. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (West 2012). 
 133. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 239. 
 134. Id. at 240. 
 135. Id. at 241. 
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defending the action, suit, or proceeding shall be paid by the 
corporation . . . 136 
 The court did not address the “action, suit, or proceeding referred to 
in division (E)(1) or (2)” that is referenced twice in the provision.  
Sections (E)(1) and (2) govern indemnification rights.137  The court of 
appeals addressed this issue extensively.  In doing so, it came to the 
conclusion that cases under (E)(1) and (2) are cases in which the director 
is seeking to secure a benefit for the corporation.138  The concurring 
appellate opinion found that the cases referred to in those provisions are 
those in which the “the person acted in good faith and in a manner the 
person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests 
of the corporation,” in other words, when the director is protected by the 
business judgment rule.139  The Ohio Supreme Court rejected those 
arguments, finding the court of appeals wrongly made advancement 
reliant on indemnification.140 
The Ohio Supreme Court then relied on Stein which stated 
a company that undertakes to advance defense costs may not avoid that 
obligation by claiming that the litigation against its former employee for 
which the employee seeks advancement of defense costs accuses the 
employee of conduct that, if proven, would foreclose indemnification or 
establish a breach . . . of duty.141   
The Stein court was not analyzing the right to advancement but rather 
was looking at advancement in an Erie Doctrine analysis.142  
Furthermore, the Miller Court failed to recognize distinctions in the 
Ohio and Delaware statutes.  The Delaware code states that 
“expenses . . . may be paid by the corporation,” as provided for in the 
corporation’s articles or bylaws.143  Unlike the Ohio provisions, the 
Delaware statute contains no reference to the types of actions or 
proceedings for which advance fees are allowed.  In fact, the Delaware 
statute only states that fees may be paid in advance when a corporation 
receives an undertaking stating that the director or officer will repay the 
amount if it is determined he is not entitled to indemnification.144  
Therefore, when the Stein Court held that alleging misconduct does not 
eliminate the obligation of advancement, it was interpreting a different 
 
 136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (West 2012) (emphasis added). 
 137. Id. § 1701.13(E)(1)–(2). 
 138. Miller v. Miller, 942 N.E.2d 438, 445 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist. 2010). 
 139. Id. at 446 (Grendell, J., concurring). 
 140. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 237. 
 141. Id. (emphasis added). 
 142. United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230, 271–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 143. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (West 2011) (emphasis added). 
 144. Id. 
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statute as well as the rights provided in the specific company’s articles 
of incorporation and contracts with the defendants in that case.145  The 
Ohio Supreme Court, therefore, was incorrect in relying on Stein to do a 
substantive analysis on whether the defendant in Miller had a statutory 
right to advancement under Ohio law.  This holding renders the 
additional language in the code superfluous, violating one of the key 
canons of statutory interpretation, namely that the legislature means 
what it says and does not use superfluous words.146 
Based on the language of the statute, the court should have limited 
advancement to cases in (E)(1) or (2).147  It should have also specified to 
what cases (E)(1) and (2) referred.  Although the court points out that 
relying on indemnification for advancement is inconsistent with the 
general understanding that does not allow the court to disregard the 
language in favor of a reading that is based on distinct law, the court did 
not declare the language in the statute inconsistent.  Instead, it ignored 
explicit statutory language. 
The Shareholders-Miller argued that (E)(5) was limited to actions 
challenging a director’s conduct as a director.148  According to 
Shareholders-Miller, (E)(1) and (2) should be read in conjunction with 
the undertaking requirement of (E)(5)(a)(i)–(ii).149  The standard in the 
undertaking is the same as the standard for the business judgment rule 
protection in section 1701.59.150  Therefore, the statute should not 
require advancement in cases in which “the director’s action or failure to 
act involved an act or omission undertaken with deliberate intent to 
cause injury to the corporation or undertaken with reckless disregard for 
the best interests of the corporation.”151 
The defendant argued that (E)(5) was meant to cover any lawsuit filed 
against a director that is “based on his or her position as director, 
regardless of whether that lawsuit was filed by the corporation itself, by 
shareholders of the corporation, or by a person or company outside of 
the corporation.”152  Sections (E)(1) and (2) refer to actions brought by a 
person or party outside of the corporation and those brought “by or in 
the right of the corporation,” respectively.153  This suggests that the 
statute anticipated directors being sued by their corporations and being 
 
 145. Id.; see also Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 239. 
 146. See, e.g., Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 962 A.2d 342, 351 (Md. 2008).  The 
Court in Miller also cites statutory canons, but then ignores them.  Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 240. 
 147. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5) (West 2012). 
 148. Shareholders Brief, supra note 44, at 29–30. 
 149. Id. at 30.  
 150. Id. at 31. 
 151. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (West 2012)). 
 152. Miller Brief, supra note 45, at 11. 
 153. Id. 
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advanced legal fees.154  
The statutory language is ambiguous.  The statute specifically 
references (E)(1) and (2) twice, but the court merely states that 
advancement is not reliant on indemnification without providing an 
explanation for that clause. 
The reference to the indemnification provision does place a limit on 
the mandatory advancement.155  The court did not see any limits in the 
Ohio statute because advancement, according to Delaware law, would 
not have any limits.156  In this instance, comparison with the scope of 
Delaware law was misplaced because Delaware does not have default 
statutory advancement.157  Any inquiry into the scope and circumstances 
in which advancement is allowed under Delaware law would be an 
inquiry into the specific grant in the corporation’s articles of 
incorporation, not the wording of the statute.  Therefore, the company 
chooses the extent of the advancement.  Contrarily, a limitation on the 
extent of the default advancement is appropriate where the legislature, 
not a specific company, places a uniform advancement requirement on 
all corporations.  The limitation should strike a balance between 
preserving the director’s right to advancement and safeguarding against 
the unusual circumstances present in Miller. 
Bearing in mind that the beneficiary of this statute was intended to be 
the corporation is important.158  Neither interpretation of the language by 
the parties (“seeking a benefit for the corporation” or “by or in the right 
of the corporation”) helped Trumbell in this case.  The corporation was 
at war with itself.  Although Trumbell was named as a plaintiff and was 
paying the plaintiff’s legal fees, the Board never voted to be a part of the 
suit.  The Board had no real independent voice, yet was the only party 
being forced to pay.  The case was a derivative suit, implying that the 
corporation was to be the beneficiary of the ruling, but the unique 
circumstances called that presumption into question.159  The court failed 
to address who represented Trumbell and what were Trumbell’s 
interests.  That failure, combined with rendering the limitation language 
moot, made the court’s espousal of advancement doctrine contrary to the 
purpose and the plain language of the statute. 
 
 154. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 6. 
 155. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (West 2012) (“Unless at the time of a director’s 
act or omission that is the subject of an action, suit, or proceeding referred to in division (E)(1) or (2) of 
this section . . . .”). 
 156. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 237 (Ohio 2012). 
 157. See United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 158. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 2. 
 159. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 1, at 1047 (“[A]ny relief recovered in a derivative 
action . . . is returned to the corporation.”). 
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2. The Need for a Meaningful “Cooperation” Standard 
In the absence of any language addressing statutory limitations on 
advancement, the court could have created a strict standard for 
reasonable cooperation by the director. 
As the court points out, advancement is not automatic; it arises when 
a director has completed an undertaking.160  In the undertaking, the 
director agrees to repay the fees if his conduct is deemed to have been 
recoverable under section 1701.59 and to reasonably cooperate with the 
corporation.161  The court did not set any standard for cooperation.  In 
fact, the court found the director cooperated, despite evidence that the 
director was more than just elusive.162  Given the unintended 
consequences of the statute, the court should have balanced the 
inequities by strictly construing the terms “reasonably cooperate,” to 
place a higher, but appropriate, burden on a director who receives the 
benefit of payment. 
Trumbell’s status as a close corporation and the family feud within 
the board created unique circumstances in Miller that are pertinent here.  
The statute required the director to cooperate with the corporation.163  
But, as shown above, the corporation had no independent voice in the 
litigation. 
The majority in Miller dismissed the idea that a director could not 
“reasonably cooperate” with its opponent in litigation.164  The dissent 
stressed this point and encouraged the General Assembly to take up the 
issue.165  Neither examined what level of cooperation would be needed 
to meet the statute’s requirement, nor did they use the facts to support 
their argument for or against a meaningful standard of cooperation.  
The majority stated that no evidence showed that the defendant 
“actually failed to cooperate,” suggesting that a mere promise to 
reasonably cooperate is enough for advancement.166  Here, the trial court 
sanctioned Director Miller after finding that he wrongfully withheld 
documents during discovery.167  In a deposition, Director Miller refused 
to answer a question, explaining that he would comply only with 
requests from a majority of the Trumbell Board, whom Director Miller 
felt represented the corporation.168  Furthermore, Director Miller knew 
 
 160. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5) (West 2012). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 240 (Ohio 2012). 
 163. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a)(ii) (West 2012).  
 164. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 241. 
 165. Id. at 243. 
 166. Id. at 240–41. 
 167. See Shareholders Brief, supra note 44, at 15. 
 168. Id. at 18.  
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that it would be impossible for a majority, and therefore the plaintiff, to 
make a request of him because he and his fellow defendant were the 
other two directors.169  Therefore, when he agreed to cooperate, he knew 
he would not have to comply with any request from the plaintiff.170  In 
that way, Justice O’Donnell was correct to point out in his dissenting 
opinion that it was impossible for the defendant and plaintiff to 
reasonably cooperate.  The dissent solves the problem of what level of 
cooperation is necessary by eliminating advancement duties when the 
director is a party-opponent to the corporation.171  That seems too far-
reaching when applied to all circumstances where the corporation is 
suing a director.  As the dissent states, he agrees with the majority that a 
corporation cannot avoid advancement “by making the mere allegation 
that the director committed fraud or breached a fiduciary duty.”172  The 
statute also clearly anticipated advancing fees when directors are 
defendants.173  But the dissent’s argument should apply in special 
circumstances, like Miller, in which the parties are too intertwined in a 
close corporation for the director to be able to cooperate. 
The fact that Director Miller’s promise to cooperate was clearly 
illusory should have resulted in a finding that he did not meet the 
requirements of the undertaking.  According to the majority, however, 
Director Miller fulfilled the requirements of the undertaking, and his 
statement during discovery was not enough to demonstrate Director 
Miller failed to cooperate.  
The Court ignored the fact that no majority of the board existed in 
this case, and no independent corporation was available to make a 
request of Director Miller.174  Instead, the majority read the “reasonably 
cooperate” language to mean that the defendant “need not surrender his 
right to defend himself” but did not elaborate on how far he may go to 
defend himself while cooperating with the party suing him.175  
The majority opinion went too far in finding that a director who 
withholds documents and states he will only comply with requests he 
knows are impossible has met the statutory requirement of cooperation.  
The trial court went so far as to award attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff for 
the additional expenses incurred due to the defendant’s withholdings.176  
By this standard, even if sanctions are imposed for obstruction, a 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. at 4–5. 
 171. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 243 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id.  
 173. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 3. 
 174. Shareholders Brief, supra note 44, at 18. 
 175. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 240–41. 
 176. Shareholders Brief, supra note 44, at 15. 
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defendant would still be cooperating.  Delaying disclosure of materials 
harmful to the defendant, but required by law to be disclosed, would fail 
under the majority’s idea of preserving the right to defend oneself.  But 
wrongfully withholding documents cannot be considered legally 
defending oneself. 
Because Miller was the first time the Ohio Supreme Court looked at 
the amended statute, no other case law exists addressing the level of 
cooperation a director must abide by in order to receive advanced legal 
in Ohio.177  However, problems exist with both the majority’s and the 
dissent’s views on how to address this issue.  Merriam-Webster defines 
“cooperate” as: “to act or work with another or others; act together or in 
compliance.”178  What did the General Assembly intend when it required 
a director to cooperate with the corporation? 
Cooperation clauses are common in insurance policies, including 
D&O insurance.179  An insurer may require that in order for the insurer 
to defend a suit, the insured must cooperate in good faith.180  Actions 
that constitute a violation of a cooperation clause include failure to give 
notice of [a possible claim], failure to forward paperwork timely, and 
failure to give honest and complete answers.181  These actions hinder the 
insurer from preparing an adequate defense.182  
The insurance setting is distinct from this one because, in the context 
of insurance, it is always in the best interest of both the insured and 
insurer to cooperate in order to mount a successful defense.  
Nonetheless, it provides an informative standard for cooperation.  
Director Miller would have failed under the insurance test by failing to 
produce documents and refusing to answer questions. 
Director Miller also failed to cooperate because his agreement to 
cooperate was made in bad faith.183  Director Miller knew he would 
 
 177. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 233. 
 178. Cooperate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/cooperate (last visited Aug. 27, 2013). 
 179. RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:106 (4th ed. 2012), available at 
Westlaw 16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:106.  See also JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP II ET AL., LAW OF 
CORPORATE OFFICERS & DIRECTORS § 8:34 (2012), available at Westlaw LAW OF CORP. OFFICERS & 
DIR. § 8:34 (“D&O policies may contain a cooperation clause providing that the insurer’s consent to 
settlements shall not be unreasonably withheld.  Rather, the insurer shall be entitled to full information 
and all particulars it may request in order to reach a decision as to the reasonableness of the settlement.  
These clauses often provide that the corporation may not take any action that increases the exposure of 
the insurer.  The purpose of these clauses is to prevent collusion between the insured and allegedly 
injured party during a settlement.”) (citations omitted). 
 180. LORD, supra note 179, § 49:107. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. § 49:106. 
 183. MARY THERESE K. FITZGERALD ET AL., OHIO JURISPRUDENCE § 473 (3d ed. 2012), available 
at Westlaw 12 Ohio Jur. 3d § 473. 
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never have to cooperate because a majority of the Board, and therefore 
the corporation, would never be able to make a request.  Although the 
standard for cooperation is unclear from the statute, the General 
Assembly made it a requirement and would not have done so if it could 
be complied with as easily as the court found.  
D. What Happens Next 
After the Miller decision, many questions exist about how to deal 
with advancement, most of which are beyond the scope of this article. 
This section will briefly address three areas of concern after Miller: (1) 
corporations opting out of advancement entirely; (2) corporations being 
forced to pay legal fees in a suit where their interests are not adequately 
protected; and (3) directors taking advantage of a lenient cooperation 
standard. 
1. Corporations Opting Out 
The easiest solution to the issues raised in Miller is that corporations 
should opt out of advancement, making it a non-issue.  However, 
because the right to advancement is a key consideration for potential 
directors, the lack of this right could dissuade quality candidates from 
choosing to become directors.184  Furthermore, the ability to purchase 
D&O insurance makes having to pay out attorneys’ fees less of a 
financial issue for corporations.185  Opting out completely would also be 
harmful to the corporation.  If a director was the subject of an action 
where he was trying to get judgment on behalf of the corporation, 
advancing legal fees would be in the corporation’s best interest.  The 
corporation could advance fees, even if it opted-out entirely, but a 
director who had to seek permission of the board may be dissuaded from 
the claim altogether.  Furthermore, if everyone opted out of the 
advancement provision, the statute would be rendered moot and the 
protections afforded by it meaningless.  The General Assembly adopted 
the statute to make Ohio friendlier to corporations, and default 
advancement is an important tool to accomplish that goal.186 
2. Inadequate Protection of the Corporation’s Interest 
Second, in cases like Miller in which the corporation’s interests are 
illusory and the Board is at war, the advancement statute will no longer 
 
 184. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 2. 
 185. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 1, at 690. 
 186. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 2. 
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serve to protect quality directors and corporations.  Instead, both sides 
will loot the corporate treasury because no one can adequately protect 
the corporation’s interest.  Under Ohio law, corporations are distinct 
from both their shareholders and their directors.187  Both groups, 
however, are expected to represent and preserve the interests of the 
corporation.  A majority of the board is deemed to represent the 
corporation, and shareholders can bring a complaint on behalf of an 
injured corporation through derivative suits.188  As the court held, 
advancement contemplates four situations in which a director has a right 
to advancement: (1) when the corporation, by a vote of the majority of 
the board, sues a director; (2) when the corporation, in a derivative 
action brought by shareholders, sues a director; (3) when the corporation 
or director is sued by a third party; and (4) when the director sues a third 
party on behalf of the corporation.  In Miller, whose facts did not fall 
neatly into any of these categories, the court made a generally applicable 
legal pronouncement, thereby ignoring the corporation’s interest.  After 
Miller, courts no longer need to look at the corporation’s role in the suit.  
Instead, regardless of form and procedure, directors can use the 
corporation’s treasury to fund their offensive and defensive actions 
under the guise of benefit to the corporation.  This will have a larger 
effect on closely held corporations, like Trumbell, which have few board 
members, are family run, and whose sole shareholders are also directors.  
Because advancement becomes mandatory with a simple execution of 
meaningless promises, corporate funds can be pilfered to fund family 
feuds and Board arguments without any regard to fiduciary obligations 
or safeguards for the corporate interest.  
3. Worthless Cooperation 
The third problem presented by Miller is that no standard for 
cooperation was set and directors could easily take advantage of this and 
in fact are encouraged to because they are not paying the legal fees.  
Defendant-corporations have an incentive to draw out a case in hopes of 
the plaintiff abandoning the case due to lack of money or effort.  A 
plaintiff-director who has unlimited advanced fees would have the same 
incentive as the defendant-corporation to draw out litigation.  After 
Miller, a corporation must always advance legal fees to a director when 
it receives an undertaking, including a promise to cooperate given in bad 
faith.  A director should not be able to withhold documents for months 
and refuse to answer requests from members of the board and still 
 
 187. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 1, at 191 (“A corporation is a legal person or legal entity.”); 
see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13 (West 2012). 
 188. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 2. 
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receive his legal fees.  If that were the case, why would a director not be 
“difficult”?  The corporation is essentially battling itself, but the 
defendant has no incentive to bring a quick close to the case.  In fact, the 
longer the director can withhold documents and weasel out of questions, 
the more the corporation will have to pay for the director’s legal fees.  
The court established no standard for cooperation and allowed a director 
acting in bad faith, much less a merely “difficult” director, to receive 
advancement, creating an incentive for the director to be disagreeable.  
Furthermore, in cases like Miller where the director knows a majority 
vote is impossible, the director has no duty to cooperate at all.  That runs 
contrary to the purpose of advancement and the general interest of 
corporations, as well as the statutory requirement of ORC 
1701.13(E)(5)(a). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Miller, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the 1986 Ohio amended 
advancement statute.  It held that advancement of legal fees to directors 
is mandatory unless a corporation specifically opts out of the provision, 
or the corporation can show the director has not met the requirements of 
the undertaking.  The court generally interpreted the advancement 
statute correctly, but it left many questions unanswered, rendering the 
future of the advancement right unclear. 
The General Assembly should reexamine this statute in light of the 
issues in Miller to determine how best to accomplish its goal of 
attracting and retaining corporations.  It should amend the statute to 
include specific situations when advancement applies, instead of 
referring to another part of the statute, to make the advancement right 
clear. 
After Miller, corporations and transactional attorneys should pay 
close attention to the duties the corporations are undertaking when 
incorporating in Ohio and protect the corporation against situations like 
Miller, where the only losing party was the corporation. 
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